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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of the absolute volumes and composition of foreign capital
stocks in South Africa, focusing on the role played by institutional quality (property rights), domestic risk
and neighbourhood e⁄ects as potential determinants. The empirical ￿ndings show that secure property
rights and low risk in the host country positively a⁄ect the absolute volumes of both long-term and short-
term foreign capital, but tilt the composition of foreign capital in favour of long-term foreign capital.
The empirical results also demonstrate the existence of neighbourhood e⁄ects where the institutional
environment in Zimbabwe has a signi￿cant impact on South Africa￿ s foreign capital in￿ ows. It is shown
that weak property rights in Zimbabwe lead to an increase in South Africa￿ s foreign direct investment
(FDI), but a reduction in South Africa￿ s portfolio investment. This suggests that Zimbabwe and South
Africa compete for foreign direct investment in similar sectors, and present two alternative investment
destinations to foreign investors. As such, when property rights in Zimbabwe worsen, FDI appears to
switch to South Africa as an alternative. By contrast, poor property rights in Zimbabwe appear to raise
the perceived risk for portfolio investment in South Africa.
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1 Introduction
International capital ￿ ows represent a major source of ￿nancing investment in developing countries. It is
consequently important to understand the determinants of the foreign capital in￿ ows. As part of the broader
debate on the role of institutions in determining economic outcomes, the international ￿nance literature is
concerned with the question of how institutional factors such as property rights and corruption a⁄ect foreign
capital in￿ ows and stocks. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of property rights and
domestic risk on the absolute volumes and composition of foreign capital stocks in the context of a middle-
income country. The paper systematically explores the impact of neighbourhood e⁄ects on the host country￿ s
foreign capital stocks. Neighbourhood e⁄ects, for our purposes, refer to systematic cross-boundary impacts of
favourable or unfavourable characteristics of neighbours, which may in￿ uence a country￿ s long-run economic
performance (Easterly and Levine, 1998). In exploring how a country￿ s own property rights and those of its
neighbour a⁄ect foreign capital stocks, the paper makes use of a new set of indicators which measure de jure
property rights.
￿School of Economics, University of Cape Town, f.gwenhamo@uct.ac.za
ySchool of Economics and Economic Research Southern Africa, University of Cape Town, johannes.fedderke@uct.ac.za
1Since the political transformation of 1994, South Africa has attracted relatively more portfolio investment
than foreign direct investment (FDI). On average, between 1994 and 2002, FDI in￿ ows amounted to 1.5% of
GDP per year, whereas portfolio investment in￿ ows totalled about 3.5% of GDP. The current composition
of South Africa￿ s foreign capital raises important questions given that it contrasts sharply with the country￿ s
pre-1994 composition of foreign capital. Ahmed et al (2005) similarly point out that the predominance of
portfolio investment in￿ ows in South Africa deviates from the experience of other emerging middle-income
countries where FDI tends to outweigh portfolio investment.
It has been argued that the composition of foreign capital received by a country determines whether the
capital is bene￿cial or detrimental to the host country (Dooley and Warner, 1995). In this regard, FDI is
often considered superior to portfolio ￿ ows and foreign loans, as it potentially facilitates the transfer of new
technology, helps improve workers￿skills and enhances market access by the recipient country (Borensztein
et al. 1998). Furthermore, FDI is generally considered to be more stable and resilient during periods of
￿nancial stress than portfolio investment in￿ ows. According to this view, a high relative share of FDI in
total foreign capital in￿ ows is a sign that the recipient country is less prone to ￿nancial crises and generally
in good health.
There is, however, an alternative strand of literature, a branch of the New Institutional Economics,
which argues that the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital in￿ ows and stocks tends to be lower in
countries that are safer, more promising and have better institutions and policies.1 This argument is based
on the notion that FDI is less subject to expropriation than other forms of foreign capital in￿ ows because
of its intangible nature (technology and brand names). Countries that have tighter ￿nancial constraints
and weak institutions will therefore ￿nance themselves primarily through FDI, which is seen as harder to
expropriate. Interpreting a high share of FDI in total foreign capital in￿ ows as a sign of good economic
health is therefore unwarranted. In view of these di⁄erent approaches to a desirable composition of foreign
capital, it is crucial to understand how the host country￿ s institutional quality and risk in￿ uence both the
absolute levels and the composition of foreign capital. While FDI may be relatively stable compared to
other ￿ ows, its preponderance in total foreign capital in￿ ows may simply be an indication of institutional
weaknesses and high domestic risk in the host country.
The existing empirical literature on foreign capital in South Africa established that secure property rights
and low domestic risk increase the absolute volumes of all forms of foreign capital, but the compositional
e⁄ect is under-explored.2 This paper extends the existing empirical literature in the following ways. Firstly,
in addition to determining the impact of institutions and domestic risk on the absolute volumes of foreign
capital stocks, the paper also explores the impact of these factors on the composition of foreign capital stocks
in South Africa.
Secondly, the paper extends the notion of risk by including neighbourhood e⁄ects from Zimbabwe as a
determinant of the absolute volumes and composition of South Africa￿ s foreign capital stocks. The possibility
of neighbourhhood e⁄ects from Zimbabwe to South Africa emanates from the strong trade and business ties
between the two countries, as supported by the data in table 1, which records Zimbabwe￿ s contribution to
South Africa￿ s trade turnover relative to other countries in Southern Africa over the period 1992 to 2002. The
existence of such close economic ties provides channels through which institutional and economic changes
in Zimbabwe can be transmitted to the South African economy. The choice of Zimbabwe as the neighbour
is also in￿ uenced by observation that it has had the most substantial negative shock to its institutional
environment relative to other countries in the region. The paper will thus investigate whether the quality
of institutions in Zimbabwe, measured by a de jure property rights index,3 signi￿cantly a⁄ect the absolute
1See for example Razin et al (1998), Hausman and Fernandez-Arias (2000) and Albuquerque (2003).
2See for example Wesso (2001), Fedderke and Liu (2002) and Fedderke and Romm (2006).
3See Gwenhamo, Fedderke and de Kadt (2008) for details of the property rights index.
2levels and composition of South Africa￿ s foreign capital stocks.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the foreign capital in South
Africa. This is followed by a presentation of our theoretical framework in section 3. Section 4 details the
econometric methodology used. The empirical ￿ndings and discussion of the results are presented in section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the ￿ndings and policy implications.
2 A Brief Background to the Composition of Foreign Capital
Stocks in South Africa
In line with convention, the South African monetary authorities distinguish between three main sub-components
of total foreign capital in￿ ows. The ￿rst category is long-term FDI,which involves investment in a ￿rm where
foreign investors have at least 10% of voting rights. The second category, namely portfolio investment, in-
cludes the purchase by foreigners of South Africa￿ s bonds and equities with less than 10% voting rights. The
third category, other investments, constitutes foreign loans and deposits between companies, banks and the
government.
South Africa￿ s political democratisation in 1994 saw its re-integration into the world economy. This
was accompanied by a surge in the international capital in￿ ows. Since the early 1990s, South Africa also
experienced changes in the composition of its foreign capital in￿ ows and stocks. Figure 1 shows the FDI and
portfolio investment stocks as percentage a of GDP. It is evident that prior to 1990, FDI stocks exceeded
portfolio investment stocks by a sizable margin. This contrasts with most of the post-1990 period when
portfolio investment stocks outweighed FDI stocks.
[Insert ￿gure 1 about here]
The only exception to the domination of portfolio investment stocks in the post-1990 era was between
1999 and 2001, a period during which FDI stocks grew much faster than portfolio investment stocks. The
sharp growth of FDI stocks between 1999 and 2001 was, however, due to four of South Africa￿ s largest MNCs
moving their major listing from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to the London Stock Exchange.4 The
London listing requires that the company moves its headquarters to London and registers as a UK Company
(Heese, 2000). The South African plants of these ￿rms thus became part of South Africa￿ s FDI stocks by
means of book entry, in￿ ating the growth of the FDI stocks. It follows that generally there is a shift in
the composition of South Africa￿ s foreign liabilities away from FDI to portfolio investment in the post-1990
period.
3 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework consists of two types of models. First we rely on the portfolio theoretic framework
to explain the absolute levels of FDI and portfolio investment. Secondly, we adopt models from the New
Institutional Economics to explain the composition of foreign capital stocks.
According to the portfolio diversi￿cation literature, strong institutions and low domestic risk tend to
encourage foreign capital in￿ ows.5 We follow Fedderke (2002) in specifying a portfolio theoretic model that
underpins the impact of institutional and risk factors on the absolute volume of foreign capital. The core
drivers of foreign capital fall into two classes of determinants, namely the rate of return and risk factors.
4Billiton, Anglo American, South African Breweries and Old Mutual, listed in London in 1999 while Didata followed suit in
2000, and Richemont moved its major listing to Switzerland (Ernst & Young, 2001).
5Kraay et al (2000).
3There are positive responses to the rates of return and negative responses to risk. The model de￿nes the
expected return on a portfolio of capital assets faced by an agent as
E (R) = DR ￿ DC + FR ￿ FC (1)
where DR and DC are the expected return on domestic and foreign capital assets respectively and FR and FC
are the cost of adjustment of domestic and foreign asset holdings respectively. Costs of adjustment arise due
to information and transaction costs associated with altering the composition of the capital asset portfolios.
Returns to domestic assets are distinguished from returns to foreign assets by having a non-zero probability
of "expropriation" denoted by ￿D.
Expropriation includes factors such as nationalisation of assets, periods of domestic instability which
might lower the returns to domestic investment, capital controls, and direct or implicit taxes faced by


















;￿;￿ > 0 (3)
where Kd and Kf denote domestic and foreign capital asset holdings respectively. For adjustment costs, the






















;c;d > 0 (5)
All of a, b and ￿D might be a⁄ected by policy intervention that raises the friction cost of moving capital
assets across international boundaries. The net present value of the expected return on a portfolio of capital








Optimisation of the investors￿expected returns yields an equation showing the mix of the foreign to







￿ (￿ ￿ c￿)(1 ￿ ￿D)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿D)(￿ ￿ a￿)
(7)
where ￿ denotes the rate of time discount, ￿; ￿ relate to the marginal rate of return on domestic assets,
￿ ￿; relate to the marginal return on foreign assets, a; b to the marginal cost of adjusting domestic asset
holdings, c; d to the marginal cost of adjusting foreign asset holdings and ￿D to the risk of expropriation that
attaches only to domestic assets. To the extent that our interest lies in the impact of the host (domestic)
country￿ s property rights and risk on the absolute volumes of foreign capital, we focus on the condition
that @$K
@￿D > 0. It shows that rising expropriation risk reduces the host country￿ s assets in the international
investors￿portfolio, through its negative e⁄ect on expected marginal returns of the portfolio.
The literature on the composition of foreign capital is divided on how institutional and risk factors
in￿ uence the composition of foreign capital in￿ ows and stocks. Models such as that of Albuquerque (2003)
attempt to explain why institutional weaknesses and high domestic risk, tilt the composition of foreign
4capital away from non-FDI capital towards FDI capital. According to the model, FDI has a risk-sharing
advantage over other capital ￿ ows because it contains more intangible assets such as human and organisation
capital that are inalienable. This makes FDI less attractive to expropriate when compared to non-FDI foreign
investment. The model assumes that international investors make a decision to invest in either an inalienable
FDI project denoted by kf, or an alienable non-FDI project denoted by ko in a chosen host country. Only
a share of the current revenues ￿ 2[0,1] from FDI activity will be lost if the host country defaults, such that
1-￿ is the degree of inalienability of FDI.
The ￿rst-order conditions which dictate the optimal composition of foreign capital ￿ ows to maximise the










































where A is the productivity factor, ￿f and ￿o are the shares of FDI and non-FDI foreign capital in the host
country￿ s production function respectively, s
0
is a shock in the host country, r is the interest rate on the




is the recipient country￿ s utility under autarky.
The ￿rst-order conditions imply that international investors optimise their returns when the marginal













for each kx. The default premium measures the marginal cost to the investor
of the host country￿ s incentive to default. Since the default premium is higher for non-FDI ￿ ows, the solution
will be such that the level of FDI is no smaller than the level of appropriable capital, k￿
f ￿ k￿
o. Although the
model is set up in the context of foreign capital in￿ ows, its predictions can be extended to foreign capital
stocks which show the accumulated foreign capital in￿ ows over time. The prediction of the model is that
the relative share of FDI in total foreign in￿ ows and stocks is higher for ￿nancially constrained countries if
￿ < 1; the ￿-hypothesis in the subsequent sections
In contrast to the above view, alternative models such as that of Mauro (2004) argue that inalienability of
FDI depends upon the sectorial allocation of FDI. In particular, it is argued that Albuquerque￿ s ￿ hypothesis
only applies to FDI in high technology or human capital-intensive sectors where the bene￿ts of expropriating
foreign capital by the host country are very low, thus making FDI su¢ ciently inalienable. In most developing
countries, however, FDI is concentrated in capital-intensive sectors and/or the primary commodities sector
where the host country can easily expropriate and bene￿t from foreign capital. Under such conditions, the
Albuquerque (2003) prediction breaks down, leading to a relationship where institutional weaknesses and
high domestic risk lead to a composition of foreign capital biased towards non-FDI foreign capital.
In addition to domestic risk and the host country￿ s institutional framework, foreign capital ￿ ows are also
a⁄ected by neighbourhood e⁄ects. Contagion occurs when political and economic events in the progenitor
country a⁄ect the absolute levels and the composition of foreign capital in the neighbouring countries. There
are two strands of literature that explain how contagion takes place. The ￿rst strand of literature focuses
on fundamental economic channels such as close trade links, similar initial economic and ￿nancial linkages
through which a crisis in one country can be propagated to its neighbours.6 The second strand of literature
stresses the herding behaviour on the part of economic agents, where crisis propagation is transferred between
markets even in the absence of real market links.
6Rigobon and Forbes (2000)
54 A Review of Empirical Literature
Empirical work consistently concur that high institutional quality and low domestic risk are associated with
high absolute volumes of FDI, portfolio investment and other forms of foreign capital.7 However the role of
institutional quality and domestic risk in determining the composition of foreign capital in￿ ows and stocks
has been under-explored and the existing empirical work yields con￿ icting results.
The pioneering work of Hausman and Fernandez-Arias (2000) considered the determinants of the share
of FDI ￿ ows in total foreign capital in￿ ows, using averages for 1996 to 1998 for a cross-section of advanced
and developing countries. They found a strong, positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between
the default risk and the share of FDI in total capital in￿ ows. In contrast, country risk had a negative
and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the absolute levels of total foreign capital in￿ ows. They concluded
that riskier countries receive less foreign capital, but these countries tend to get more of their ￿ ows in the
form of FDI. With regards to institutional quality, their results showed that the relative FDI share in total
capital in￿ ows is strongly and negatively associated with measures of institutional development compiled by
Kaufmann et al (1999) and with the La Porta et al (2000) indices of shareholder rights. They conclude that,
while good institutions positively a⁄ect the volume of capital ￿ ows, they skew the composition away from
FDI to other ￿ ows. Their results support the ￿-hypothesis.
Albuquerque (2003) considered the determinants of the composition of capital ￿ ows for a cross-section
of both developed and developing countries for the period 1975 to 1997. With average FDI shares in gross
private capital ￿ ows as a dependant variable, and controlling for GDP per capita and trade openness, he
found that the country risk measured by Moody￿ s sovereign credit ratings had a strong negative e⁄ect on the
share of FDI in total capital in￿ ows. Since the Moody￿ s credit rating assigns higher scores to countries with
lower default risk, the Albuquerque (2003) result implies that good (poor) credit ratings decrease (increase)
the share of FDI in total ￿ ows, supporting the ￿-hypothesis.
In contrast to the above results, Ahmed et al (2004) do not ￿nd evidence supporting the ￿-hypothesis for
a sample of 81 developing countries, including South Africa. They found the share of FDI in total foreign
capital in￿ ows to be positively and signi￿cantly in￿ uenced by the institutional quality measured by the ICRG
index of law and order. Since countries that rank high on the ICRG index have high-quality institutions,
the positive coe¢ cient implies that strong institutions result in FDI dominating foreign capital in￿ ows. The
study also showed that the share of FDI in total foreign capital in￿ ows tends to be higher in economies with
abundant resources and low trade restrictions.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b) analysed how variables such as trade openness, per capita GDP,
stock market capitalisation, market size and natural resource availability a⁄ect the composition of countries￿
foreign liabilities. Using a sample of developing and transition countries that included Sub-Saharan Africa,
they found trade openness to be the dominant factor in explaining the share of FDI in total foreign liabilities.
However, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a) acknowledged that the limitation of their work was the failure to
control for institutional explanatory variables.
5 Empirical Models
The ￿rst hypothesis tested in this paper is that secure property rights in the host country will increase the
host country￿ s absolute volumes of FDI and portfolio investment stocks, while high domestic risk will have
an inverse e⁄ect. To test this hypothesis, the empirical speci￿cations shown in equations 10 and 11 are
estimated separately for South Africa for the period 1960 to 2005.





























Variable de￿nitions and plots are given in appendix 1 and 2 respectively and the signs below the variables
are the a priori expectations.
We expect that domestic risk, denoted by RISK, has a negative e⁄ect on the absolute levels of FDI
and portfolio investment stocks and that the quality of property rights in the host country, denoted by
LPROPERT, positively a⁄ect the absolute volume of FDI and portfolio investment stocks. The quality of
property rights in the neighbouring country, in this case Zimbabwe, represents neighbourhood e⁄ects and
is expected to have a positive e⁄ect on the absolute levels of FDI and portfolio investment stocks in South
Africa, due to positive spill-over e⁄ects channeled either through the close business linkages between the two
countries or through investors herding behaviour.
The other explanatory variables are selected from past literature. Real GDP, denoted by LRGDP, is
expected to have a positive e⁄ect on the absolute levels of FDI and portfolio investment stocks. Trade
openness, denoted by OPEN, is expected to have a positive e⁄ect on FDI stocks. A priori, we expect that
labour costs, denoted by LAVWAGE, have a negative e⁄ect on FDI. The capital-labour ratio, denoted by
LRATIO, could have either a positive or negative e⁄ect on FDI depending on whether vertical or horizontal
FDI dominates.
High real short-term interest rates in the host country relative to other countries tend to attract relatively
more short term foreign capital. It is therefore expected that the real Treasury Bill rate has a positive e⁄ect
on the portfolio investment stocks. CREDIT, a proxy for the ￿nancial sector development, is expected to
have a positive e⁄ect on portfolio investment stocks.
The empirical speci￿cation for investigating the determination of the composition of foreign capital stocks
















The signs on risk and property rights are ambiguous depending on whether the ￿-hypothesis holds or
otherwise. Regarding the other explanatory variables, GDP is expected to have a positive e⁄ect on the
relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks.8 A priori, we expect trade openness to have a positive
e⁄ect on the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks.9 Since relatively high domestic real short-
term interest rates in the host country tend to attract relatively more short-term foreign capital, RTBR is
expected to have a negative impact on the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks. Financial
sector development, captured by the variable CREDIT, is expected to have a positive e⁄ect on the relative
share of FDI total foreign capital stocks.10
6 Econometric Methodology
We employ the Johansen estimation technique11 to estimate the structural models for the determinants of
the absolute levels of FDI and portfolio investment stocks and of the relative share of FDI in total foreign
8See, for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b) and Ahmed et al (2005).
9Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b), Albuquerque (2003) and Ahmed et al (2005).
10See, for example, Ahmed et al (2002).
11Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1991, 1992).
7capital stocks. In its general form, an unrestricted VAR is speci￿ed as follows:
Zt = A1Zt￿i + AmZt￿m + ￿ + ￿t (13)
Where Zt is an n x 1 matrix of endogenous variables, m is the lag length, ￿ is the matrix of deterministic




￿i￿Zt￿i + ￿Zt￿k+1 + ￿ + ￿t (14)
The existence of r cointegrating relationships amounts to the hypothesis that:
H1 (r) : ￿ = ￿￿
0
(15)
where ￿ is a p x p matrix, ￿ is the p x r loading matrix capturing the speed of adjustment to equilibrium
and ￿ is p x r matrix of long-run coe¢ cients. ￿ and ￿ are assumed to be of full rank. Therefore, H1 (r)
is the hypothesis of reduced rank of ￿. When r > 1, issues of identi￿cation arise12 and should be resolved
by means of restrictions on the loading matrix (￿), the matrix representing short-run dynamics and the
cointegration space(￿).13
Our empirical speci￿cations are presented in equations 16 and 17 and 18. In the FDI model, theory
postulates the existence of feedback e⁄ects from FDI to output. Borensztein et al (1998) argued that FDI
enhances productivity and output in the host country. Therefore, theoretically, we expect two long-run
relationships in equation 16, one explaining FDI and the other explaining GDP. A priori, we expect a single
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12Wickens (1996), Johansen (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996).








































































Where all the variables are de￿ned in appendix A.
7 Findings
In accordance with the requirements of the VECM technique, table 3 reports the results of the ADF test
statistics con￿rming that all variables included in the study are I(1). The standard ADF tests are com-
plemented by the Perron (1989) unit root tests to account for structural breaks. For each variable; several
break points are determined exogenously. The Perron test is then implemented for each break point. The
results in appendix 3 indicate that all variables are I(1) subject to the presence of structural breaks.
Insert table 3 about here]
Given the small sample size, we follow the maximum eigenvalue statistic indicating two cointegrating
vectors in the FDI model, as shown in table 4, and a single cointegrating vector for both the portfolio
investment and the FDI-share models, as shown in table 5 and 6 respectively 14
[Insert table 4 about here]
[Insert table 5 about here]
[Insert table 6 about here]
7.1 Discussion of the Long-run Parameter Estimates
Table 7 reports the long-run parameter estimates for the FDI model. Our baseline overidenti￿ed model is
shown in column B and can be represented by the equilibrium relationships in equations 19 and 20.





















The error correction terms for the LFDI and LGDP vectors are -0.105 and -0.934 respectively. Since,
both error correction terms are between 0 and -2 and are statistically signi￿cant, the estimated relationships
are stable dynamically.
Our focus is on equation 19 which explains the determination of FDI. In line with the predictions of the
portfolio diversi￿cation literature, RISK has a negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient of -3.01. This
implies that an increase in the domestic risk, measured by the South African-American sovereign spread,
14Enders (2004) argues that the maximal eigenvalue statistic is more appropriate in small sample sizes.
9leads to a decrease in FDI stocks. LPROPERT has a positive statistically signi￿cant elasticity of 1.64,
showing that an improvement in the ratings of the status of formal property rights in South Africa leads to
an increase in FDI. The results con￿rm that secure property rights and low domestic risk tend to increase
the absolute volumes of FDI to South Africa. These ￿ndings are consistent with those of Faria and Mauro
(2004), who established that institutional quality, measured by the average of the Kaufmann et al (2003)
governance indicators, has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI for a number of emerging economies,
including, South Africa.
Consistent with earlier studies, GDP has a positive elasticity of 1.57, supporting the market-size hypothe-
sis which predicts that long-term FDI is attracted to countries with substantial market sizes. Trade openness
also has a positive and signi￿cant impact on FDI. In the GDP equation shown in equation 20, it is evident
that there exist feedback e⁄ects from FDI to GDP, with an implied elasticity of 0.06. This supports the
argument by Borensztein et al (1998) that FDI has some productivity-enhancing e⁄ects in the host country.
In model C, we control for the institutional environment in Zimbabwe using the de jure property rights
index, LPROPERTZ. A priori, we expected that secure property rights in Zimbabwe would have a positive
spill-over e⁄ect on FDI in South Africa. It is evident that there is a negative and signi￿cant relationship
between FDI stocks in South Africa and the property rights index for Zimbabwe, with an implied elasticity
of -1.06. Since the property rights index for Zimbabwe assigns higher values for more secure property rights,
the negative sign shows that worsening (improving) property rights in Zimbabwe will increase (decrease) the
stocks of FDI in South Africa. Although this result contradicts our a priori expectations, there is a plausible
explanation. A probable explanation for this ￿nding is that Zimbabwe and South Africa compete for foreign
investment and present two alternative investment destinations to foreign investors who are interested in
investing in Southern Africa. As property rights in Zimbabwe worsen, investors may decide to relocate to a
safer investment destination in South Africa.
We now examine the long-run parameter estimates for the absolute portfolio investment model presented
in Table 8.
Insert table 8 about here]













The error-correction term for the above relation is -0.159 and suggests that the estimated relationship is
dynamically stable. Although RISK has a marginal statistical signi￿cance, the negative coe¢ cient of -2.13
suggests that portfolio investment is discouraged by increasing levels of domestic risk. Consistent with the
portfolio diversi￿cation literature, LPROPERT has a positive and statistically signi￿cant elasticity of 1.41.
The other control variables, GDP denoted by LRGDP, the real Treasury Bill rate denoted by RTBR and
the ￿nancial sector development denoted by CREDIT, all have a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect
on portfolio investment stocks in line with our a priori expectations. Although LPROPERTZ is marginally
signi￿cant, it has a positive e⁄ect on the portfolio investment stocks in South Africa, suggesting that as
property rights in Zimbabwe improve (worsen), the portfolio investment stocks in South Africa increase
(decrease). Poor property rights in Zimbabwe in this case have a negative spill-over e⁄ect on portfolio
investment in South Africa. This contrasts with our earlier ￿nding for FDI, where it was shown that poor
property rights in Zimbabwe lead to an increase the absolute level of FDI in South Africa.
The di⁄erences of the impact of neighborhood e⁄ects on FDI and portfolio investment could be explained
by the di⁄erent time horizons of FDI and portfolio investment. On the one hand, FDI tends to be long-term
in nature. Thus, when the property rights in Zimbabwe deteriorate, South Africa may receive more FDI as
10long-term direct investors relocate their investment from Zimbabwe to South Africa. This allows the long-
term foreign investors to continue having access to resources and markets in the Southern African region.
On the other hand, portfolio investment is generally short-term. As such, when property rights in Zimbabwe
deteriorate, short-term foreign investors may disinvest or stop new investments in South Africa due to fear
of contagion.
Thus far we have established the impact of institutional quality (property rights), domestic risk and
neighbourhood e⁄ects on the absolute volumes of FDI and portfolio investment stocks. We now turn to the
question of how these factors impact on the composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa. Table 9
reports the results for the FDI-share model.
[ Insert table 9 about here]














It is evident from the error-correction terms that the relationship is dynamically stable. The results show
that RISK has a negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the relative share of FDI in total foreign
capital stocks, with a coe¢ cient of -0.94. This implies that, as domestic risk in South Africa increases,
the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks decreases. Although the property rights index is
marginally signi￿cant, its positive sign suggests that an improvement of property rights in South Africa will
lead to an increase in the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks.
The ￿ndings suggest that domestic risk and institutional ine¢ ciency reduce the relative share of FDI
in total foreign capital stocks. This contradicts the ￿-hypothesis suggested by Albuquerque (2003), which
postulates that poor institutional quality and domestic risk increase the relative share of FDI in total foreign
capital stocks due to the risk-sharing advantage of FDI. Instead, the results are in line with an alternative
hypothesis suggested by Faria and Mauro (2004), who argue that FDI in the capital-intensive and natural
resource sectors is not inalienable and is thus fully appropriable. This leads to a relationship where domestic
risk and institutional ine¢ ciency reduce the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks.
A possible explanation for our empirical ￿nding is that FDI in South Africa is concentrated in the natural
resource and -/or capital-intensive sectors where the host country can expropriate foreign investment easily.
When property rights and the institutional environment weaken under such circumstances, foreign investors
tend to shift their investment away from FDI to other forms of foreign capital, thus reducing the relative share
of FDI in total foreign capital stocks. In the short-run, RISK and LPROPERT are statistically insigni￿cant,
as shown in the lower panel of table 4.9 in column A. This shows that the ￿-hypothesis is not satis￿ed in the
short-run either.
These results con￿rm those of Ahmed et al (2005), who found that the institutional quality measured by
the ICRG index of law and order positively a⁄ects the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital in￿ ows for
a group of 81 developing countries, including South Africa. Ahmed et al (2005) suggested that their ￿ndings
could be explained by the concentration of FDI in the natural resources and human capital-intensive sectors
where FDI is not inalienable.
The other control variables have plausible elasticities that are consistent with earlier empirical literature.
LRGDP, OPEN and CREDIT have positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on LFDISHARE. This shows
that, as national income, trade openness and ￿nancial sector development improve, the share of FDI in total
foreign capital stocks goes up. The variable RTBR has a negative e⁄ect on LFDISHARE, suggesting that
higher short-term interest rates reduce the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks. These results
11are in line with the earlier ￿ndings of Lane and Milesi (2001a, 2001b), Albuquerque (2003) and Ahmed et al
(2005).
Model C shows that LPROPERTZ has a negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on LFDISHARE. This
implies that, as property right worsen (improve) in Zimbabwe, the share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks
in South Africa increases (decreases) and this can be explained by the impact of neighbourhood e⁄ects on
the absolute volumes of FDI and portfolio investment. It was established that deteriorating property rights
in Zimbabwe increase the absolute levels of FDI, but reduce the absolute levels of portfolio investment in
South Africa. As such, deteriorating property rights in Zimbabwe will lead to an increase in the relative
share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks.
8 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to investigate the impact of institutional quality (property rights), domestic risk
and the neighbourhood e⁄ects on the absolute volumes of FDI and portfolio investment, as well as the
composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa, for the period 1960 to 2005. The paper contributes
several important insights. The ￿rst point is that domestic risk, which is a combination of default risk and
currency risk, negatively a⁄ects the absolute levels of FDI and portfolio investment, and that institutional
quality, proxied by an index of de jure property rights for South Africa, positively a⁄ects the absolute levels
of FDI and portfolio investment stocks. These results are consistent with our a priori expectations that an
environment characterised by high-quality institutions and low domestic risk is conducive for all forms of
foreign capital.
The second point is concerned with the e⁄ect of domestic risk and property rights on the relative share
of FDI in total foreign capital stocks. In contrast to the ￿-hypothesis, we found that domestic risk and
institutional weaknesses reduce the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks. A likely interpretation
is that, in the long-run, FDI in South Africa is not inalienable and a reduction in the relative share of FDI
in total foreign capital stocks is not an indication of increasing institutional e¢ ciency. This result could be
explained by the concentration of FDI in the natural resources extraction and/or capital-intensive sectors,
where the host country government and/or political elite can easily expropriate foreign capital.
From the above we can conclude that, while good institutions (secure property rights) and low domestic
risk increase the absolute volumes of both FDI and portfolio investment, the compositional e⁄ect is to create
an external capital structure biased towards FDI. For the South African government, the results suggests
that, to change the current composition of foreign liabilities, which is biased towards portfolio investment,
the government should implement policies that ensure low domestic risk (both default and currency) and
secure property rights. The same policy recommendation was made by Ahmed et al (2001) for a group of
81 countries, including South Africa. In addition, secure property rights and low domestic risk will not only
increase the relative share of FDI in total foreign capital stocks, but it will also increase the absolute levels
FDI and portfolio investment.
The third issue is concerned with the neighbourhood e⁄ects, captured by including the de jure property
rights index for Zimbabwe as an explanatory variable for foreign capital stocks in South Africa. In contrast
to our expectation, it was found that deteriorating property rights in Zimbabwe will lead to an increase in
the absolute levels of FDI stocks as well as the relative share of FDI in total foreign investment stocks in
South Africa. A plausible explanation for this ￿nding is that Zimbabwe and South Africa present alter-
native destinations to foreign investors interested in investing in the Southern African region. Therefore,
deteriorating property rights in Zimbabwe may induce foreign direct investors to relocate their investment
from Zimbabwe to South Africa. However, in the case of the short-term portfolio investment, it was shown
12that there is a positive relationship between the de jure property rights index for Zimbabwe and portfolio
investment stocks for South Africa. This implies that deteriorating property rights in Zimbabwe will lead
to a decrease in the portfolio investment stocks in South Africa. This outcome suggest that, while South
Africa and Zimbabwe could compete for long-term foreign capital, the two countries should cooperate with
each other in ensuring a sound institutional environment conducive to all forms of foreign capital.
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15Tables and figures 
Figures  
Figure 1: South Africa’s FDI and Portfolio Investment Stocks a as percentage of GDP 
 
Tables 
Table 1: The contribution of Southern African Countries to South Africa’s trade turnover (%) 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
 
Angola 
  0.32  0.22  0.2  0.21  0.55  0.42  0.38  0.47  0.36  0.56  0.6 
Botswana 
 
0.01  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Comoros 
  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Lesotho 
  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Madagascar 
 
0.1  0.11  0.06  0.09  0.1  0.12  0.1  0.09  0.08  0.1  0.08 
Malawi 
  0.77  0.61  0.51  0.44  0.51  0.57  0.58  0.61  0.49  0.48  0.49 
Mauritius 
 
0.36  0.43  0.44  0.36  0.41  0.46  0.37  0.41  0.52  0.47  0.47 
Mozambique 
 
0.82  1.07  1.11  0.99  1.03  1.09  0.99  1.4  1.35  1.3  1.16 
Namibia 
 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Swaziland 
 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Zambia 
 
1.03  1.06  0.77  0.71  0.85  0.91  0.82  0.84  1.22  1.14  1.07 
Zimbabwe 
 
2.11  1.89  2.14  2.64  2.5  2.39  2.22  2.04  1.55  1.47  1.61 
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16 
Table 2: South Africa’s Net Foreign Capital Inflows as a percentage of GDP 
  Net capital inflows as % of GDP 
Year      Net total         Net FDI    Net Portfolio investment  Net other Investment (short 
and long term loans) 
1960-1969  0.97  0.66  0.04  0.26 
1970-1979  0.48  -0.29  0.18  0.60 
1980-1989  -0.75  -0.19  -0.12  -0.45 
1990  -0.30  -0.09  0.01  -0.21 
1991  -0.94  0.03  0.20  -1.18 
1992  -0.61  -1.48  1.33  -0.46 
1993  -1.29  -0.22  0.57  -1.64 
1994  0.74  -0.63  2.08  -0.71 
1995  3.81  -0.83  1.65  2.99 
1996  1.71  -0.16  1.55  0.31 
1997  3.79  0.99  4.46  -1.66 
1998  1.99  -0.91  2.74  0.15 
1999  2.38  -0.06  6.43  -3.99 
2000  0.21  0.46  -1.50  1.24 
2001  -2.28  8.41  -6.63  -4.06 
2002  1.06  1.77  -0.37  -0.34 
2003  -1.15  0.10  0.52  -1.77 
2004  3.28  -0.26  2.91  0.62 
2005  4.93  2.36  1.94  0.63 
2006  5.86  -2.82  7.42  1.26 
2007  7.55  0.91  4.17  2.47 
Source: SARB Database. 
 
Table 3: ADF Unit Root Tests. 
Variable  Levels  First Difference 
         
LFDI  1.13  -0.89  -3.47*  -4.87* 
LRGDP  -0.93  -2.33  -4.09*  -4.00* 
LPI  1.80  -1.73  -5.38*  -5.88* 
LFDISHARE  -1.59  -1.24  -6.65*  -6.75* 
RISK  -1.69  -3.09  -4.61*  -6.01* 
LPROPERT  -.077  -1.85  -7.20*  -7.10* 
OPEN  -0.75  -0.48  -4.24*  -5.08* 
LAWVAGE  -1.11  -2.10  -5.45*  -5.34* 
LRATIO  -2.16  -.022  -8.64*  -6.88* 
RTBR  -2.18  -3.62*  -4.67*  -5.49* 
CREDIT  0.90  -1.31  -5.54*  -4.85* 
LPROPERTZ  -0.57  -0.69  -3.91*  -4.53* 







17Table 4: Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Statistics for Cointegration for the FDI model 
Unrestricted intercepts and no trends, Order of the VAR = 2   
Null  Alternative  Max Eigen 
Value 
90% Critical Value  95% Critical 
Value 
r = 0  r = 1  83.1450*  45.6300  42.7000 
r<= 1  r = 2  62.9767*  39.8300  36.0200 
r<= 2  r = 3  30.3070  33.6400  31.0200 
r<= 3  r = 4  20.9323  27.4200  24.9900 
Null  Alternative  Trace Value  90% Critical Value  95% Critical 
Value 
r = 0  r = 1  221.5186*  124.6200  119.6800 
r<= 1  r = 2  138.3736*  95.8700  91.4000 
r<= 2  r = 3  69.3969*  70.4900  65.2300 
r<= 3  r = 4     45.08  46.8800  35.7500 
Notes:* denotes rejection of null at the 5% level of significance.  
 
Table 5: Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Statistics for Cointegration for the Portfolio 
Investment model 
Unrestricted intercepts and no trends, Order of the VAR = 2 
Null  Alternative  Max Eigen 
Value 
90% Critical Value  95% Critical 
Value 
r = 0  r = 1  54.3457*  39.8300  36.8400 
r<= 1  r = 2  28.81  34.6400  31.0200 
r<= 2  r = 3  27.6918  27.4200  24.9900 
Null  Alternative  Trace Value  90% Critical Value  95% Critical 
Value 
r = 0  r = 1  125.3001*  95.8700  91.4000 
r<= 1  r = 2  70.9545*  70.4900  66.2300 
r<= 2  r = 3  42.1375  48.8800  45.7000 
r<= 3  r = 4  14.4458  31.5400  28.7800 
Note:* denotes rejection of null at the 5% level of significance.  
 
Table 6: Maximal Eigenvalue and trace statistics for Cointegration for the FDI-Share model 
Unrestricted intercepts and no trends, Order of the VAR = 2 
Null  Alternative  Max Eigen 
Value 
90% Critical Value  95% Critical 
Value 
r = 0          r = 1  62.5087*  45.6300  42.7000 
r<= 1        r = 2          35.6570  39.8300  36.8400 
r<= 2  r = 3  25.8582  33.6400  31.0200 
Null  Alternative  Trace Value  90% Critical Value  95% Critical 
Value 
r = 0          r = 1  181.2465*  124.6200  119.6800 
r<= 1        r = 2          118.7378*  95.8700  91.4000 
r<= 2  r = 3  63.0808  70.4900  65.2300 








Table 7: Long-run and Short-run Parameter Estimates for the FDI equation 
 
Notes: 1) Figures in round and square brackets are absolute t-statistics and p-values respectively. 2) * and ** denotes 
significance at 5% and 10% respectively. 
   
  (A)  (B)  (C) 




LFDI  LRGDP  LFDI  LGDP  LFDI  LGDP 
             
LFDI     -1  0.056* 
(2.11) 
      -1  0.058* 
(2.10) 
-1  -0.063* 
(3.10) 
             
LRGDP    3.353** 
(1.95) 










             












             












             












             












             
LRATIO  0.000  0.874* 
(13.09) 
0.000  0.8788* 
(13.37) 
0.000  0.8465* 
(18.65) 
             




       
LR Test of 
restrictions 




Short-run Parameter Estimates 












             
























SAMPLE  1962-2005  1962-2005  1962-2005 
19Table8: Long-run and Short-run Parameter Estimates for the Portfolio Investment Model 
  A  B  C 
Long -run Parameter Estimates 
Dependant Variable  LPI  LPI  LPI 
LPI  -1  -1  -1 
       






       
RISK  -2.125 
(1.51)  0.000 
-1.645 
(1.12) 
       






       






       






       
LPROPERTZ 
----  ---- 
2.953 
(1.59) 
       
LR Test of 
restrictions  ---- 
(1)= 5.32[0.02] 
Rejects  restriction  ---- 
Short-run Parameter Estimates 
















SAMPLE  1962-2006  1962-2006  1962-2006 
Notes: 1) Figures in brackets are absolute values of the asymptotic t-statistics. 2) * and ** denotes significance 



















20Table 9: Long Run and Short Run Parameter Estimates for the LFDISHARE equation 
  A  B  C 
Long Run Parameter Estimates 
Dependant Variable  LFDISHARE  LFDISHARE  LFDISHARE 
LFDISHARE  -1  -1  -1 
       






       






       






       






       






       






       
LPROPERTZ 
----  ---- 
-0.348 
(2.75) 
       
LR Test of 
restrictions  ---- 
(1)= 4.42[0.035] 
Rejects restriction  ---- 
Short Run Parameter Estimates 






       






       






       









       
SAMPLE  1962-2005  1962-2005  1962-2005 
Notes1) Figures in round and square brackets are absolute t-statistics and p-values respectively. 2) * and ** denotes 











Appendix 1: Variable Description and Data Sources 
Variable   Description  Source 
LFDI    Log of  Real FDI Stocks at 2000 prices  SARB 
 
LRGDP  Log of Real Gross Domestic Product at 2000 prices  SARB 
 
LPI  Log of Real Portfolio Investment Stocks at 2000 prices  SARB 
 





RISK  Country risk premium measured by the South Africa-
U.S.A. sovereign spread and computed by Log of South 
Africa’s 3 year government bond rate minus log of 






LPROPERT  Log of the Property Rights Index for South Africa  Fedderke et al (2001)
1 






LAWVAGE  Log of the Average Wage at 2000 prices  SARB 
 
LRATIO  Log of the Capital-Labor Ratio  SARB 
 
RTBR  Real 91-day Treasury Bill Rate  SARB 
 
CREDIT  Ratio of the Credit issued to the private sector to GDP  SARB 
 
 
LPROPERTZ  Log of the Property Rights Index of Zimbabwe  Gwenhamo et al (2008) 
GOLD  Dummy for the gold price boom of 1981-1984   
DFDI  Dummy for the surge in real FDI stocks due to the listing 
of some South African Multi-Nationals on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2001. 
 
DPI  Dummy for the surge in real portfolio investment stocks 















                                                 
1The Fedderke et al (2001) property rights index is available from 1950 to 1997. For the purposes of this study, 
the series was extended to 2005. The extension was done by assuming that the index did not change between 
1996 and 2005. This is a reasonable assumption given that there were no substantial changes to the legislation 
regulating property rights in South Africa between 1997 and 2005. 










   
   
 
 
   
 
 




   
   
     
   


































































    
 











































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
 




   
 
   
 
                                                                                                                   
 
     
   





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3: Perron Unit Root Test with Structural breaks 
Variable   Date of Break Point  Levels  First Difference 
LFDI    1998  -3.55  -14.45* 
  2002  -2.74  -4.33* 
  2004  -1.98  -4.82* 
 
LRGDP  1992  -1.04  -5.08* 
 
LPI  1992  -3.34  -6.63* 
  2003  -1.94  -5.56* 
 
LFDISHARE  1972  -1.67  -4.73* 
  1980  -0.99  -4.93* 
  1998  -2.64  -5.66* 
 
RISK  1973  -2.84  -5.13* 
  1977  -2.25  -4.98* 
  1979  -2.46  -4.61* 
  2000  -2.62  -5.24* 
 
LPROPERT  1977  -0.33  -4.52* 
  1982  -1.96  -4.48* 
 
OPEN  1971  -1.49  -4.52* 
  1991  -3.26  -4.72* 
 
LAWVAGE  1980  -0.94  -4.77* 
  1997  -3.10  -4.82* 
 
LRATIO  1977  -1.61  -12.24* 
  1982  -3.14  -10.04* 
 
RTBR  1972  -1.06  -5.63* 
  1980  -2.50  -5.54* 
  1984  -1.61  -4.34* 
  1986  -3.88  -4.88* 
 
CREDIT  1980  -1.78  -4.26* 
  2002  -3.28  -9.01* 
 
LPROPERTZ  1999  -1.90  -7.63* 
Notes:  * denotes the rejection of the null of non-stationarity at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 
25